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WHY UN INSPECTIONS? CORRUPTION, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 
 
Stuart S. Yeh* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corruption takes a variety of forms.  Significantly, the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) specifies that 
corruption includes "the abuse of functions or position, that is, the 
performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a 
public official in the discharge of his or her functions" as well as 
giving any person "an undue advantage" resulting from the abuse by 
a public official of his or her influence.1  One hundred seventy-four 
nations ratified the UNCAC, signaling their support for this 
definition of corruption.2 
 The persistence of corruption is associated with a culture of 
impunity.  Individuals who engage in corrupt behavior presumably 
do so because they believe that the risk of punishment is low relative 
to the reward.  This suggests a need to identify what is missing from 
the environment surrounding these individuals that leads them to 
believe that the risk of punishment is low.  If an institutional structure 
                                                
 * The author is an Associate Professor of Evaluation Studies at the 
University of Minnesota. His interests include the development of 
international institutions to address corruption and promote the rule of law. 
The author gratefully acknowledges permission from SAGE to republish 
material from his earlier publication, entitled, Is an International Treaty 
Needed to Fight Corruption and the Narco-Insurgency in Mexico?, 22 INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. REV. 242, 242–50 (2012). 
 1  United Nations Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature 
Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 (entered into force Dec. 14, 2005) 
[hereinafter UNCAC]. 
2 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations 
Convention against Corruption  
Signature and Ratification Status as of 12 November 2014, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited 
June 15, 2015). 
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is missing, what is that structure?  For example, one type of structure 
is a dedicated domestic anticorruption unit.  However, while many 
countries have created this type of unit, results have been 
disappointing. 
 Section 2 of this article explores the reasons for this failure by 
drawing upon the experience of Nigeria's Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC).  The analysis suggests that this type of 
domestic anticorruption unit can only be successful if it is insulated 
from interference by powerful domestic elites who benefit from the 
continuation of corruption.  Section 3 suggests that a promising 
strategy involves implementing the type of bilateral treaty that 
established the International Commission against Impunity and 
Corruption in Guatemala (CICIG).  This type of institution, 
establishing UN inspectors, might provide the type of protection that 
is needed by domestic anticorruption units.  Section 4 proposes an 
international treaty establishing UN inspectors empowered to 
investigate allegations of corruption, analyzes prospects for 
ratification, examines issues raised by the proposal, and suggests that 
the precedent established by the Rome Statute (where 122 nations 
previously agreed to permit intrusive criminal investigations)3 offers 
reason for optimism.  Section 5 concludes that the implementation of 
this type of international treaty could have a profound effect on the 
culture of impunity that prevails wherever corrupt individuals feel 
that the risk of punishment is low. 
 
II.  NIGERIA'S ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES 
COMMISSION 
 
 The experience of Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) is instructive.  The EFCC was established in 
2002, after the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo, with a 
mandate to investigate and prosecute a range of financial crimes, 
including governmental corruption.4  In 2005, the EFCC investigated 
all of the country's thirty-six powerful state governors and asserted 
that almost all were corrupt.5  By November 2006, five had been 
                                                
 3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for 
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 4 See Letitia Lawson, The Politics of Anti-Corruption Reform in Africa, 
47 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 73, 83–84 (2009). 
 5 See id. at 85. 
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charged with corruption and were impeached.6  By April 2008, the 
EFCC had recovered $5 billion in stolen public funds and secured 
250 convictions, including a chief of police, a governor, and a 
minister.7 
 The EFCC's director, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, moved aggressively 
to institutionalize the EFCC; he obtained a $5 million grant from the 
World Bank, permitting the EFCC to target political corruption at the 
highest levels without fear of the financial consequences to his 
agency.8  He established international links between the EFCC and 
INTERPOL, the United Kingdom's Metropolitan Police, the US 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Canadian Mounted Police, and 
South Africa's Scorpions, extending the EFCC's capacity to 
investigate corruption.9  Through his efforts, a coalition of civic 
groups agreed to mobilize 500 lawyers, including twenty-five Senior 
Advocates, to support EFCC prosecutions of corrupt officials.10  
 However, even these dedicated efforts were insufficient to 
protect the EFCC.  Powerful elites had already begun to strike back.  
In August 2007, “Attorney General Michael Aondoakaa announced 
that the independent prosecutorial powers granted to the EFCC . . . 
were unconstitutional, and that all future prosecutions would need to 
be vetted by his office.”11  This blocked the EFCC's prosecution of 
former Governors Joshua Dariye and Orji Uzor Kalu.12  In December 
2007, the EFCC arrested former Governors Ayodele Fayose and 
James Ibori, a well-connected, powerful supporter of President Yar' 
Adua.13  The government quickly struck back by announcing that the 
EFCC, the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), and 
the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) would merge, followed by a 
second announcement that Ribadu had been reassigned to attend a 
one-year policy and strategic studies course in central Nigeria.14  
                                                
 6 Id.  
 7 Id. at 91.  
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 90. 
 10 Id. at 91.  
 11 Id. at 87. 
 12 Id. at 88.  
 13 Fayose, Ibori Sent to Prison, ALLAFRICA (Dec. 18, 2007), 
http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200712180033.html. 
 14 Abdullahi Yahaya Bello, Nigeria: EFCC/ICPC/CCB - One Merger, 
Many Questions, ALLAFRICA  (Dec. 22, 2007),  
http://allafrica.com/stories/200712220006.html?page=1; Kingsley Omonobi 
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Within a year, Ribadu was demoted along with 139 other police 
officers, then dismissed and driven into exile.15 An EFCC official 
told Human Rights Watch that these moves were intended to 
undermine “the independence of the EFCC and halt the investigation 
and prosecution of former governors.”16 
 The case of Nigeria's EFCC illustrates how domestic 
anticorruption units are neutralized by powerful elites who benefit 
from the continuation of corruption and seek to thwart domestic 
anticorruption agencies.  However, this case suggests that these units 
can be very effective if they are insulated from interference.  Is it 
possible for the international community to install an institution that 
would provide such insulation? 
 
III.  GUATEMALA'S CICIG 
 
 A promising approach involves the type of bilateral treaty 
between the United Nations and Guatemala that established the 
CICIG. 17   This treaty authorized the creation of a body of 
international, UN-supported inspectors to lead criminal investigations 
in Guatemala.18  The rationale is that domestic agencies, weakened 
by corruption, are no match for powerful criminal organizations.19  
 Guatemala has experienced high levels of corruption and 
violence.20  For example, in 2007, Vice President Eduardo Stein 
                                                                                           
& Emmanuel Ulayi, Nigeria: EFCC - Okiro Confirms Ribadu's Exit, 
ALLAFRICA (Dec. 27, 2007), http://allafrica.com/stories/200712280320.html. 
 15 Misbahu Bashir, Nigeria: Ribadu Demoted – With 139 Others – 
Doubts Over His NIPSS Course, ALLAFRICA (Aug. 6, 2008), 
http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200808060176.html. 
16 Nigeria: Firing of Anti-Corruption Chief Would Boost Abusive Politicians, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 2, 2008), 
http://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2008/01/01/nigeria-firing-anti-corruption-chief-
would-boost-abusive-politicians. 
 17 See Agreement between the United Nations and Guatemala on the 
Establishment of an International Commission against Corruption in 
Guatemala (CICIG), Dec. 12, 2006, 2472 U.N.T.S. 47 [hereinafter CICIG]; 
Patrick Gavigan, Organized Crime, Illicit Power Structures and Guatemala’s 
Threatened Peace Process, 16 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 62, 62 (2009); About 
CICIG, INT’L COMM’N AGAINST IMPUNITY IN GUAT., 
http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page=about (last visitited June 15, 2015).  
 18 See About CICIG, supra note 17. 
 19 Gavigan, supra note 17, at 70.  
 20 Id. 
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conceded that organized crime cartels had gained effective control of 
six of Guatemala's twenty-two departments.21  According to Human 
Rights Watch, "Guatemala's weak and corrupt law enforcement 
institutions have proved incapable of containing the powerful 
organized crime groups and criminal gangs that contribute to one of 
the highest violent crime rates in the Americas . . . .  [I]mpunity 
remains the norm . . . ."22  Illegal armed groups and criminal gangs 
operate death squads and employ violence and intimidation, 
supporting their activities through drug trafficking.23  Guatemalan 
law enforcement institutions are unable to address this rampant 
violence due to intimidation, corruption, and infiltration of the police 
and judiciary by the criminal organizations.24  In one notorious case, 
three members of the Central American Parliament were killed by 
senior members of Guatemala’s police force, including the head of 
the organized crime unit. 25   Leadership and pressure from 
Guatemalan and international human rights groups, pressure exerted 
by the UN to monitor and verify Guatemala's commitments to the 
1994 Human Rights Accord, and political calculations by Presidents 
Alfonso Portillo and Óscar Berger, led Guatemala and the UN to 
create the CICIG via a treaty-level bilateral agreement.26  The CICIG 
seeks to address the infiltration of government institutions by 
criminal organizations and the operation of violent death squads 
operating beyond the control of the Guatemalan state.27  The CICIG 
is the first instance of a UN investigative body whose jurisdiction 
focuses on corruption and organized crime, rather than human rights 
                                                
 21 Id.  
 22 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTRY SUMMARY – GUATEMALA 1 (2011), 
available at  
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/guatemala_0.pdf. 
 23 See Andrew Hudson & Alexandra W. Taylor, The International 
Commission against Impunity in Guatemala: A New Model for International 
Criminal Justice Mechanisms, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 53, 57 (2010). 
 24 Id. at 56.  
 25 Id. at 57. 
 26 See Matthew Kennis, The Creation of the International Commission 
against Impunity in Guatemala: Miscalculation by a ‘Corporate Mafia 
State’?, PEACE & CONFLICT MONITOR, 
http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=918 (last updated 
June 6, 2012).  
 27 See generally Mandate, CICIG, 
http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page=mandate (last visited June 15, 2015) 
(describing the main objectives of CICIG’s mandate). 
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violations.28 
 The CICIG employs international and local staff members to 
conduct independent investigations and produce reports that are 
submitted to Guatemalan prosecutors.29  The agreement with the UN 
specifies: 
 
The Government of Guatemala shall provide 
CICIG with all the assistance necessary for the 
discharge of its functions and activities . . . and 
shall ensure, in particular, that its members enjoy:  
(a) freedom of movement without restriction 
throughout Guatemalan territory;  
(b) freedom of access without restriction to all 
State locations . . . without prior notice . . . ;  
(c) freedom to meet and interview any 
individual . . . whose testimony is deemed 
necessary for the discharge of its mandate;  
(d) free access to information and documentary 
material that has a bearing on its investigations . . . 
whether civilian or military.30  
 
Furthermore, "The Government of Guatemala shall take such 
effective and adequate measures as may be required to ensure the 
security and protection of [CICIG personnel] . . . .  International 
personnel shall enjoy . . . immunity from personal arrest or 
detention." 31   CICIG investigators have extraordinarily broad 
freedom to conduct independent investigations into any person, 
official, or entity, and to present criminal charges to Guatemala’s 
Public Prosecutor.32  However, the CICIG is not empowered to 
enforce cooperation or impose penalties for noncompliance.33 
 The CICIG’s activities during its first four years suggest that this 
type of international investigative body can quickly achieve success, 
despite having limited enforcement tools and no independent ability 
to prosecute.  The CICIG's investigations led to the indictment of 
                                                
 28 Id. 
 29 See CICIG, supra note 17, at 50–51. 
 30 Id. at 53. 
 31 Id. at 54–55. 
32 See id. at 52–53.  
 33 See generally id. at 50–56 (lacking specificity on potential penalties 
for failure to cooperate with the CICIG). 
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powerful individuals including ex-President Alfonso Portillo for 
corruption; ex-Defence Minister Eduardo Arévalo Lacs for 
corruption; Senior Prosecutor Álvaro Matus for obstruction of justice 
and destruction of evidence; General Enrique Ríos Sosa, son of 
former Guatemalan General Efrain Rios Montt, and five other ex-
military officials for embezzlement; the kidnappers of Gladys 
Monterroso, wife of the Human Rights Ombudsman; and four 
members of the National Civilian Police who engaged in extortion 
and assault.34  “In all eight cases, the accused [were] directly and 
visibly connected to government institutions, politicians[,] or drug-
trafficking organizations.”35  
 When Judge Irma Leticia Valenzuela issued a ruling that 
protected ex-President Portillo, the CICIG appealed to Guatemala's 
Supreme Court, forcing Judge Valenzuela to resign from the case.36  
The CICIG also forced multiple resignations of public prosecutors 
                                                
 34 See Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at 66–67.  Rios Montt was 
found guilty and sentenced to eighty years in prison for genocide and crimes 
against humanity.  Emi McLean, Guatemala’s Constitutional Court 
Overturns Rios Montt Conviction and Sends Trial Back to April 19, INT’L 
JUSTICE MONITOR (May 21, 2013), 
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/05/constitutional-court-overturns-rios-montt-
conviction-and-sends-trial-back-to-april-19/.  The Constitutional Court 
overturned the decision, sending the trial back to the lower courts. Id.  
Portillo was “acquitted despite damning evidence against him” but later 
extradited to the United States “to face charges of money laundering, fraud[,] 
and embezzlement of public funds.”  James Bargent, Last Rites for 
Guatemala’s Anti-Impunity Crusaders CICIG?, INSIGHT CRIME (Sept. 6, 
2013), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/last-rites-for-guatemalas-
anti-impunity-warriors.  An initial two-year mandate was established by the 
agreement between the United Nations and the government of Guatemala, 
and was renewed in April 2009 and January 2011.  United Nations, Dept. of 
Political Affairs, CICIG (International Commission against Impunity in 
Guatemala), 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/americ
as/cicig (last visited June 15, 2015).  “Its current mandate runs through 
[September 4,] 2015.”  Id.  The current Guatemalan President, Otto Perez 
Molina, has announced that he will not extend CICIG's mandate when it 
expires in September 2015.  Geoffrey Ramsey, Guatemala’s Supreme Court 
Judges Take the Bench, THE PAN-AM. POST (Nov. 24, 2014, 9:41 AM), 
http://www.thepanamericanpost.com/2014/11/guatemalas-supreme-court-
judges-take.html. 
 35 Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at 65. 
 36 See id. at 69. 
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for corruption or obstruction of justice, including Attorney General 
Juan Luis Florido, Senior Prosecutor Álvaro Matus, and 
Administrative Crimes Prosecutor Patricia Lainfiesta.37  The CICIG's 
investigations also led to a purge of 1,700 allegedly corrupt police 
officers.38  These results suggest that the CICIG is having an impact 
despite its inability to discipline or prosecute individuals, and despite 
the risk of violence to its investigators.  Accordingly, the CICIG’s 
success suggests that this type of investigative body can be 
successful even under conditions where criminal gangs, death squads, 
and powerful individuals appear to operate with impunity—
conditions that characterize many developing countries. 
 Lessons from the CICIG’s experience include the need to 
dedicate significant resources to witness and staff security.39  Unless 
witnesses and victims feel sufficiently protected, they are unlikely to 
provide crucial information and the necessary cooperation for a 
successful investigation.  Consequently, the CICIG created a witness 
protection program by negotiating an agreement with Spain for the 
relocation of protected witnesses, training forty-eight police officers 
to create an elite group of agents responsible for protecting witnesses, 
and successfully pressuring Guatemala to implement legislative 
reforms enhancing identity protection for witnesses in organized 
crime cases.40 
 Despite these challenges, the CICIG suggests a way forward that 
has not previously been explored.  Had Nigeria established a 
comparable agreement with the UN, Ribadu potentially could have 
filed a complaint with UN investigators, leading to an investigation 
of his demotion and dismissal as acts that fall within the UN 
definition of corruption because they were intended to protect corrupt 
government officials. 41   The mere threat of investigation and 
prosecution for corruption might have deterred Attorney General 
Michael Aondoakaa from acting in a way that blocked the EFCC's 
prosecution of former Governors Joshua Dariye and Orji Uzor Kalu, 
and might have deterred government officials from demoting and 
                                                
 37 Id.  
 38 Id. 
 39 See Witness Protection: A Necessary Tool in Justice Administration, 
CICIG (Sep. 27, 2011), http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page=0046-
20110927E. 
 40 Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at 64. 
 41 See Stuart S. Yeh, Why UN Inspections? The Accountability Gap in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 7 INT’L PUB. POL’Y REV. 1, 19 (2013). 
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dismissing Ribadu.42  Under the international treaty proposed in 
Section 4, below, UN investigators would have likely determined that 
these actions involved obstruction of justice—crimes subject to 
prosecution and punishment under Nigeria's laws.43  Having made 
that determination, and after referral of the case to domestic 
prosecutors, Aondoakaa and his corrupt colleagues would have faced 
a legitimate risk of punishment.  At a minimum, public 
condemnation might have forced Aondoakaa's resignation in the 
same way that the CICIG forced the resignations of public 
prosecutors in Guatemala for corruption or obstruction of justice.44  
 The experiences of Guatemala suggest that it is feasible to 
implement an international treaty that involves intrusive criminal 
investigations led by UN investigators even in a country where the 
rule of law is extremely weak, where powerful and violent criminal 
cartels have gained control of several government departments, 
where impunity prevails, and where the prospects for implementing 
an international treaty are less than favorable.  Guatemala's 
experience also provides reason to believe that barriers to the 
implementation of a treaty establishing UN investigators can be 
                                                
 42 See Lawson, supra note 4, at 88. 
 43 UN investigators would be more likely than domestic investigators to 
act vigorously.  While Ribadu could have filed a complaint with Nigeria's 
Public Complaints Commission (PCC) or the Independent Corrupt Practices 
Commission (ICPC), it is unlikely that these agencies would have requested 
charges against the Attorney General because all prosecutions are handled by 
the Attorney General.  See id. at 81.  In contrast, an independent UN 
investigation and report that referred charges to Nigeria's public prosecutor 
would force the prosecutor to either prosecute or risk public outrage over a 
clear failure to prosecute an egregious case of corruption and risk being 
forced to resign in the same way that the CICIG forced the resignations of 
public prosecutors in Guatemala for corruption or obstruction of justice, 
including Attorney General Juan Luis Florido, Senior Prosecutor Álvaro 
Matus, and Administrative Crimes Prosecutor Patricia Lainfiesta.  See, e.g., 
Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at 69–70.  The proposed international 
treaty contains provisions to ensure that the tactics employed by Aondoakaa 
could not be used in the future without risking prosecution for obstruction of 
justice.  The proposed treaty defines the crime of obstruction of justice, 
defines a procedure whereby UN inspectors may request an opinion from a 
domestic justice, and defines a process whereby reports of obstruction would 
be published online by Transparency International in a way that would 
publicly identify individuals accused of obstructing justice and would expose 
these individuals to the court of public opinion. 
 44 See Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at 69. 
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overcome through the leadership of international and domestic 
human rights organizations, pressure exerted by the World Bank, the 
IMF, and other nations, as well as realist political calculations by 
domestic leaders that the political benefits outweigh the political 
costs. 
 
IV. AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY 
 
 A promising strategy for fighting corruption involves the 
implementation of a multilateral treaty similar to the treaty that 
established the CICIG.45  Instituting a treaty that would establish UN 
inspectors empowered to investigate allegations of corruption might 
provide the type of protection needed by domestic anticorruption 
units from interference by powerful elites who benefit from the 
continuation of corruption.  The proposed treaty would require 
signatory parties to establish a system of courts and prosecutors 
dedicated to the adjudication and swift resolution of corruption 
charges.  These dedicated courts would be funded by the UN and 
would include checks and balances to ensure they are only served by 
honest, competent justices and prosecutors.  The dedicated courts 
would prioritize charges submitted by UN inspectors and would 
ensure the swift resolution of resulting cases.  The appendix to this 
article contains a summary of the proposed treaty provisions. 
 However, the proposal also raises numerous issues.  For example, 
it might be argued that Nigeria would never ratify the type of 
agreement that established the CICIG.  This argument presumes: (a) 
conditions for ratifying this type of agreement were more favorable 
in Guatemala than in Nigeria; (b) the influence of reform-oriented 
elements of society is stronger in Guatemala than in Nigeria; and (c) 
the rule of law is stronger in Guatemala than in Nigeria.  However, 
the violent circumstances within Guatemala suggest that conditions 
for ratification were not more favorable.46  Instead, it may be argued 
that the creation of the EFCC and its apparent successes in 
investigating all thirty-six of Nigeria's governors, indicting five 
                                                
 45 See Stuart S. Yeh, Ending Corruption in Africa through United 
Nations Inspections, 87 INT’L AFF. 629, 639 (2011); Stuart S. Yeh, Is an 
International Treaty Needed to Fight Corruption and the Narco-Insurgency 
in Mexico?, 22 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 233, 235, 242 (2012); Yeh, Why UN 
Inspections? The Accountability Gap in Sub-Saharan Africa, supra note 41, 
at 7. 
 46 See Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at 56–57. 
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governors for corruption, recovering $5 billion in stolen public funds, 
and securing 250 convictions, including a chief of police and a 
governor, are evidence that the rule of law in Nigeria is stronger than 
that of Guatemala.47  Thus, it appears that conditions in Nigeria are 
more, rather than less, favorable for the ratification of the same type 
of agreement that established the CICIG. 
 Significantly, Nigeria has ratified both the UNCAC48 and the 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
(AUCPCC).49  Both are international laws committing the parties to 
create and enforce domestic laws against corruption, and to extend 
cooperation in investigating and prosecuting corruption.50  These 
ratifications suggest that Nigeria might also ratify an international 
agreement similar to the CICIG.51  
 While it might be argued that the CICIG goes far beyond the 
UNCAC and the AUCPCC by permitting intrusive inspections by 
UN inspectors, Nigeria has also ratified the Rome Statute, which 
established the International Criminal Court (ICC) and permits 
intrusive inspections similar to the CICIG.52  The Rome Statute 
created an international body of criminal investigators endowed with 
broad powers to conduct independent investigations on domestic soil, 
similar to the investigations permitted by the CICIG.53  The primary 
                                                
47 See Lawson, supra note 4, at 91. 
 48 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations 
Convention against Corruption  
Signature and Ratification Status as of 12 November 2014, supra note 2. 
 49 See Kolawole Olaniyan, Introductory Note to African Union (AU): 
Convention on Combating and Preventing Corruption, 43 I.L.M. 1, 1 (2004).  
See also African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption, Aug. 5, 2006, 43 I.L.M. 5 [hereinafter AUCPCC]. 
 50 See CICIG, supra note 1, at 55–57; AUCPCC, supra note 49, at 5–6.   
 51 I am not suggesting that there are not differences between Nigeria and 
Guatemala.  However, there is a striking similarity among all states where 
the rule of law is weak: they are characterized by high rates of violent deaths, 
glaring impunity, corruption, the inability of the state to handle crime, public 
outrage, and demands for reform.  See Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at 
69; Chinedum Odenyi, The Domestic Implementation of International 
Treaties in Nigeria, NIGERIAN COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT 
(July 23, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://www.ncicc.org.ng/index.php/latest/83-the-
domestic-implementation-of-international-treaties-in-nigeria.  It is not 
unreasonable to think that independent investigators who offer a real hope 
for action would be welcomed in any state where these conditions exist. 
 52 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at 115–26. 
 53 Id.  
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difference is that the Rome Statute focuses on crimes of war, 
aggression, genocide, and crimes against humanity,54 whereas UN 
inspectors would focus on corruption.  However, crimes of war, 
aggression, genocide, and crimes against humanity also involve 
abuse of functions or position by public officials, and thus constitute 
an extreme form of corruption.55  The Rome Statute compels every 
citizen of a party to the treaty, including the president and powerful 
elites, to submit to independent investigators who have the powers of 
arrest, detention, trial, and conviction through the ICC.56  Thus, the 
Rome Statute establishes a precedent of surrendering domestic 
sovereignty in cases where government officials place themselves 
above the law.  
 Importantly, it was not necessary to rely on voluntary 
acquiescence by leaders to achieve adherence to the Rome Statute: 
pressure from constituents and the international community forced 
those leaders to sign the treaty or risk removal at the next election.57  
The key to this breakthrough was that the Rome Statute created a 
public litmus test of a leader’s willingness to sign an international 
treaty establishing the ICC.  Leaders evidently found that the 
pressure to sign was greater than any concerns they had about the 
challenge to their power and domestic sovereignty.58  The same 
process by which the Rome Statute was established provides a model 
for establishing a UN inspectorate, involving a similar public litmus 
test.  The UN General Assembly established a committee that drafted 
the ICC Statute, which was subsequently ratified by 123 nations.59  
The same process could be pursued to establish a UN inspectorate. 
 While it might be argued that international inspectors would be 
viewed as an unwanted intrusion into domestic affairs, international 
treaties are by definition voluntary agreements.60  Only voluntary 
                                                
 54 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at 91. 
55 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 56 See Rome Statute, supra note 3, at 92. 
57 See Chinedum Odenyi, The Domestic Implementation of International 
Treaties in Nigeria, supra note 51. 
 58 See Yeh, Is an International Treaty Needed to Fight Corruption and 
the Narco-Insurgency in Mexico?, supra note 45, at 246.  
59 The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to
%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited June 15, 2015).   
 60 United Nations Treaty Collection, Definitions of Key Terms Used in 
the UN Treaty Collection, 
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nations would accede to such a treaty.  Pressure from the 
international community might expedite passage, but no leader would 
sign a treaty, and no parliament would ratify a treaty without the 
support of their constituents.  Significantly, public opinion polls 
indicate that Africans have grown tired of failed promises from 
domestic authorities claiming they will address corruption, and are 
ready to embrace the type of international intervention represented by 
the ICC.61  For example, 61% of Kenyans prefer ICC trials while 
only 8% prefer to have domestic courts deal with the perpetrators of 
the post-2007 election-related violence.62  This evidence suggests 
that Africans may prefer international criminal inspectors for the 
same reasons that Kenyans prefer ICC trials: they might be 
persuaded that the only realistic hope to establish accountability is 
international inspectors who are beyond the government's influence.  
They want more international intervention, not less.63  Thus, leaders 
may be forced by public opinion to sign a protocol that would expand 
the scope of the UNCAC to permit investigations, led by UN 
inspectors, of alleged acts of corruption committed by public 
officials.64  The reasons that leaders would sign such a protocol are 
the same reasons that previous leaders signed the UNCAC: public 
outrage regarding corruption and pressure to create laws and 
institutions that restrict it.65  There is nothing unusual about political 
leaders signing laws that restrict their own powers: every existing 
law restricting power must necessarily have been signed into law by 
                                                                                           
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_
en.xml#treaties (last visited June 15, 2015). 
 61 See Stephen Brown & Chandra Lekha Sriram, The Big Fish Won't 
Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-Election Violence in 
Kenya, 111 AFR. AFF. 244, 245 (2012). 
 62 Id at 257.  
 63 In 2007, Nigerian President Umaru Yar'Adua invited British police 
experts to "re-invent" Nigeria's police force.  See Abegunde Babalola, Power 
of Police to Prosecute Criminal Cases: Nigeria and International 
Perspectives, 2 EUR. J. BUS. & SOC. SCI. 127, 138 (2014).  Nigeria's Inspector 
General of Police, Mike Okiro, endorsed this invitation and expressed strong 
support: "The British police need to repackage, retrain and give the Nigerian 
policemen what it takes to combat crime in the modern world."  Id. at 138 
(citations omitted). 
 64 See Yeh, Why UN Inspections? The Accountability Gap in Sub-
Saharan Africa, supra note 41, at 4.  
 65 See id. 
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previous leaders, albeit in response to pressure from their 
constituents. 
 The broad adoption by 123 nations of a treaty permitting 
intrusive inspections suggests that there is reason to believe that a 
similar agreement to establish UN inspectors might be ratified by 
many nations where levels of corruption are high and the rule of law 
is weak.  The list of parties to the Rome Statute includes many 
nations that rank poorly on Transparency International's Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI).66  Despite high levels of corruption and 
weak rule of law, these nations ratified a treaty permitting intrusive 
inspections and agreed to execute arrest warrants for all citizens 
charged by the ICC prosecutor.67  Significantly, autocracies with 
weak rule of law were at least as likely to ratify the ICC statute as 
high rule of law countries.68  Thus, governments that were arguably 
at the highest risk of ICC action were most likely to ratify the Rome 
Statute.  Therefore, there is reason to think many of these nations 
may also agree to permit UN inspections and may agree to execute 
warrants for the arrest of citizens who are charged with corruption.  
Significantly, 174 nations are parties to the UNCAC,69 and thirty-five 
African nations have ratified the AUCPCC, 70  evidencing broad 
acceptance of international laws designed to fight corruption. 
                                                
 66 These countries include Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bangladesh, 
Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, 
Timor-Leste, Uganda, Tanzania, Yemen, and Zambia.  Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/ (last visited June 15, 2015).  See 
The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 
59. 
 67 Rome Statute, supra note 3, at 103. 
68 Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the 
International Criminal Court, 64 INT’L ORG. 225, 252 (2010) ("[T]he least 
accountable governments—the least democratic, with the weakest 
reputations for respecting the rule of law, the least politically constrained—
with a recent past of civil violence were at the highest 'risk' of ratifying the 
Rome Statute."). 
 69 See UNCAC, supra note 1, at 1–3. 
 70 See AUCPCC, supra note 49, at 1–4. 
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 The reasons why the least accountable governments were most 
likely to ratify the Rome Statute are worth exploring in more detail.  
Simmons and Danner suggest that in weak rule of law countries, 
internal conflicts are rife, rebel groups unleash attacks, government 
forces retaliate, violence abounds, and many parties suffer, including 
the party in power as well as opposition parties.71  Thus, there may be 
bipartisan support and strong motivation to ratify a treaty that binds 
all parties in a way that reduces the risk of genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity, even at the cost of giving up traditional 
sovereign rights regarding the prosecution of individuals accused of 
those crimes.  In other words, the perceived benefits of ratification 
for both the governing and opposing parties may exceed the costs.  In 
addition, once the treaty is ratified, the threat of prosecution for those 
crimes becomes very real, causing all parties to restrain themselves 
out of fear of prosecution.  Similarly, there may be bipartisan support 
for an anticorruption protocol if multiple parties believe that their 
rivals are corrupt and need to be restrained.  Once a protocol is 
ratified, the threat of prosecution would become real, causing all 
parties to restrain themselves. 
 While it might be argued that even if this type of agreement were 
ratified, domestic authorities would resist cooperation with UN 
inspectors and would resist the execution of arrest warrants for 
domestic officials; any nation that ratifies the proposed treaty would 
voluntarily accede to the requirement to cooperate and to execute 
arrest warrants.72  The proposed treaty specifies procedures that 
require the cooperation of domestic authorities, including the 
cooperation of local police in executing arrest warrants, and specifies 
penalties for instances of noncooperation (see appendix).73  Once the 
treaty is ratified, these provisions would bind all domestic authorities. 
 The proposed treaty includes built-in provisions for monitoring 
domestic compliance with the terms of the treaty.74  The treaty 
                                                
 71 See Simmons & Danner, supra note 68, at 239. 
 72 See Stuart S. Yeh, Building a Global Institution to Fight Corruption 
and Address the Roots of Insurgency, 8 INT’L PUB. POL’Y REV. 7, 20 (2014). 
 73 The provisions of the proposed treaty are described in the author's 
previous publications.  See Yeh, Ending Corruption in Africa through United 
Nations Inspections, supra note 45, at 640; Yeh, Is an International Treaty 
Needed to Fight Corruption and the Narco-Insurgency in Mexico?, supra 
note 45, at 245. 
 74 For more information regarding the role of national human rights 
institutions in monitoring compliance with international treaties, see 
generally Chris Sidoti, National Human Rights Institutions and the 
242 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 11.2 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 
specifies that the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice would appoint one or more entities to monitor compliance, 
including national human rights institutions or any other entities 
deemed by the Commission to be duly qualified to monitor 
compliance.  State parties would agree to give designated monitors 
access to all reports and information necessary to formulate an 
opinion regarding the degree of compliance, including information 
deemed relevant by UN inspectors.  Refusal by domestic authorities 
to provide access to requested reports and information would 
constitute a failure of cooperation and an obstruction of justice.  
Designated monitors would possess standing to bring suit in domestic 
courts to compel the production of relevant reports and information.  
Monitors would publish regular reports regarding compliance, and 
Transparency International would publish these reports online.  The 
reports would be admissible as evidence in administrative or judicial 
proceedings in the same way and under the same conditions as 
administrative reports drawn up by national administrative inspectors.  
 It might be argued that ratification would be purely symbolic and 
would not affect behavior; however, the available evidence does not 
support this conclusion.  Ratification of the Rome Statute influenced 
behavior: the least democratic governments were almost eight times 
more likely to terminate a violent conflict if they had ratified the ICC 
statute, apparently because of the real threat of prosecution for war 
crimes.75  Thus, "the idea that ratification is purely symbolic does not 
square with the facts."76  Ratification was not a symbolic action by 
leaders who could presume they would be unaffected.77 
 While it might be argued that domestic authorities lack the 
capacity and willingness to execute arrest warrants, domestic 
authorities have already demonstrated a basic level of capacity and 
willingness.  In Nigeria, 250 individuals have been convicted of 
economic and financial crimes, including a chief of police and a 
                                                                                           
International Human Rights System, in HUMAN RIGHTS, STATE COMPLIANCE, 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE: ASSESSING NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 93 
(Ryan Goodman & Thomas Pegram eds., 2012); Richard Carver, National 
Human Rights Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS, STATE COMPLIANCE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE: ASSESSING NATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 181 (Ryan Goodman & Thomas Pegram eds., 
2012). 
 75 Simmons & Danner, supra note 68, at 247–48. 
 76 Id. at 253. 
 77 See id. at 227. 
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governor.78  In 2013, the annual conviction rate accelerated to 117 
individuals per year.79  Even in one of the most corrupt nations in the 
world, it is possible to obtain convictions.  The issue is how to 
improve the rate of prosecution and conviction in every state so that 
corrupt individuals cannot act with impunity.  In every state where 
the rule of law is weak, the introduction of independent investigators, 
with the capacity to illuminate corrupt police, prosecutors, and 
justices, would potentially plug leaks in the judicial system that occur 
when corrupt police, prosecutors, and justices believe they can 
engage in corruption without being discovered and tried in the court 
of public opinion. 
 With regard to the Rome Statute, the ICC has been effective in 
conducting successful investigations, indicting alleged criminals for 
committing mass atrocities, executing arrest warrants with the 
assistance of domestic authorities, and bringing suspects to trial.  The 
ICC’s success demonstrates that it is not a paper tiger, and adoption 
and ratification are not empty gestures by politicians to placate the 
international community.  The ICC is bringing criminals to justice in 
cases covering Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Darfur/Sudan, and the Central African Republic. 80   The Court 
convicted Thomas Lubanga, the founder of the United Congolese 
Patriots, of war crimes including kidnapping and forcing children to 
participate in armed conflict. 81   The Court convicted Germain 
Katanga, former leader of the Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri, of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.82  The Court is currently 
trying Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, former Vice President, and one of 
the richest men in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.83  The ICC is also currently 
trying Joseph Kony, the Ugandan head of the rebel Lord’s Resistance 
Army, for crimes including murder, abduction, mutilation, sexual 
                                                
78 Lawson, supra note 4, at 91. 
 79 ECON. & FIN. CRIMES COMM’N, FOR THE RECORDS: 2013 
CONVICTIONS, available at 
https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/images/EFCC_2013_Convictions.pdf. 
80 Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%2
0cases.aspx (last visited June 15, 2015). 
81 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Crimes, 
¶ 19 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/LubangaENG.pdf. 
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enslavement of women and children, and the conscription of child 
soldiers.84  Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, the first sitting head 
of state to face ICC charges, has been indicted for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in Darfur.85  Laurent Gbagbo, the former 
President of Côte d’Ivoire, was indicted and arrested for crimes 
against humanity and is currently facing trial. 86   The evidence 
suggests that international investigators can be effective and can 
obtain the cooperation and assistance of domestic authorities in 
executing arrest warrants, even in nations characterized by high 
corruption and weak rule of law. 
 However, it might be argued that, irrespective of treaty 
provisions requiring cooperation with UN inspectors and regardless 
of the success of the ICC, UN inspectors would not possess the 
legitimacy and capacity necessary to enforce the execution of 
domestic arrest warrants.  What prevents local police from refusing 
to cooperate?  
 UN inspectors would not be completely powerless.  They could 
obtain and present an arrest warrant to the local police and request 
their assistance in its execution.  Under the proposed treaty, if local 
police attempt to delay or refuse to cooperate when presented with a 
valid warrant, they would be subject to investigation and arrest by 
UN inspectors for obstruction of justice—specifically, the failure to 
execute a valid arrest warrant.  There would be real consequences.  
For example, Nigeria's criminal code makes the failure to execute a 
valid arrest warrant a felony: "Any person who conspires with 
another to obstruct, prevent, pervert, or defeat the course of justice is 
guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for seven years."87  
Thus, the failure to execute a valid arrest warrant would be an act of 
corruption, as it is an "abuse of functions" involving a "failure to 
perform an act" that is required of domestic police when presented 
with a valid arrest warrant.88  Furthermore, the Nigerian Police Code 
of Conduct requires cooperation with, for example, UN inspectors in 
the event that Nigeria ratifies the proposed treaty: "Police officers 
will cooperate with all legally authorized agencies and their 
                                                
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Criminal Code Act (1990) Cap. (4), § 126 (Nigeria), available at 
http://www.nigeria-law.org/Criminal%20Code%20Act-PartIII-
IV.htm#Chapter. 
 88 UNCAC, supra note 1, at 155. 
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representatives in the pursuit of justice."89  The Code of Conduct 
instructs Nigerian police to cooperate with legally authorized 
inspectors.90  This Code, in combination with the requirement in the 
proposed treaty to cooperate with UN inspectors and to provide any 
assistance needed to execute warrants for arrest, would obligate local 
police to assist in executing valid arrest warrants. UN inspectors 
would obtain and present a warrant to arrest the corrupt police and 
would seek the assistance of honest, competent police to execute the 
warrant.91  Even in the most corrupt nations in the world, there are 
many honest, competent police officers, as demonstrated by the 250 
arrests and convictions obtained by the EFCC in Nigeria.92  The 
conviction of a chief of police and a governor suggest that powerful 
individuals are not immune to arrest and prosecution.93  The threat of 
arrest for obstruction of justice would be a powerful deterrent to any 
local police.  Furthermore, the police would know that UN inspectors 
could not be bribed or corrupted in the same way as their corrupt 
domestic counterparts.  The danger of arrest and conviction would be 
real. 
 Since the UN would pay inspectors and their careers would 
depend on the propriety of their investigations, they could not be 
manipulated or pressured in the same way that police or investigators 
from a domestic anticorruption unit could be manipulated and 
pressured.  Unlike domestic police and domestic members of 
anticorruption units, UN inspectors would be insulated from the 
power exerted by domestic authorities over jobs and careers.  As a 
result, UN inspectors could not be subjected to the same pressure to 
tip-off suspects, tip-off local police, or give corrupt officials 
opportunities to make arrangements with local officials to obstruct 
investigations and arrests.  UN inspectors would arrive unannounced, 
giving corrupt officials no time to react.  When presented with an 
arrest warrant, the local police would have the choice of either 
                                                
 89 Code of Conduct and Professional Standards for Police Officers, 
NIGERIA POLICE FORCE, http://npf.gov.ng/code-of-conduct (last visited June 
15, 2015). 
 90 Id. 
 91 While certain justices might be corrupt and might refuse to issue an 
arrest warrant, UN inspectors could consult local staff, such as EFCC staff, 
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92 See Lawson, supra note 4, at 91. 
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cooperating with UN inspectors and executing the warrant, or 
obstructing the investigation in the hope that corrupt protectors 
would quash any attempt by UN inspectors to execute arrests for 
obstruction of justice.  But when there is a real threat of arrest for 
obstructing justice, even corrupt police would likely decide that 
cooperation with UN inspectors is the wisest course of action. 
 The same logic applies across the entire system of criminal 
justice.  It might be argued that corrupt prosecutors and judges would 
block investigations by UN inspectors, perhaps by releasing suspects, 
refusing to prosecute, refusing to hear a case, delaying judgment, or 
manipulating the outcome of a case.  Under the proposed treaty, 
however, those prosecutors and judges would be subject to 
investigation by UN inspectors for corruption and obstruction of 
justice.  The UNCAC defines corruption to include "the abuse of 
functions or position, that is, the performance of or failure to perform 
an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his 
or her functions," as well as giving any person "an undue advantage" 
resulting from the abuse by a public official of his or her influence.94  
The proposed treaty defines the crime of obstruction of justice, a 
procedure whereby UN inspectors may request an opinion from a 
domestic judge, and a process whereby reports of obstruction would 
be published online by Transparency International in a way that 
would publicly identify individuals accused of obstructing justice, 
and would expose these individuals to the court of public opinion.  
 Under the proposed treaty, any attempt to delay or thwart the 
effort of a UN inspector to obtain or execute a warrant for arrest, in 
excess of the discretionary authority of the judge who receives the 
request for a warrant, would constitute an obstruction of justice.  Any 
attempt to delay or thwart the lawful prosecution, trial, disciplinary 
hearing, or oversight hearing of an individual accused of corruption 
or obstruction of justice, in excess of the discretionary authority of 
the prosecutor, judge, disciplinary body, or oversight agency 
exercising jurisdiction over the relevant case, would constitute an 
obstruction of justice.  A prosecution, trial, disciplinary hearing, or 
oversight hearing regarding an individual accused of corruption or 
obstruction of justice that is substantially irregular, violates accepted 
prosecutorial, judicial, disciplinary, or oversight norms and practices, 
and perverts the course of justice, would constitute an obstruction of 
justice.  
 These actions would also trigger new UN investigations.  Since 
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opinions about what falls within the discretion of a prosecutor, judge, 
or disciplinary body may differ, the proposed treaty specifies that UN 
inspectors may seek a judicial opinion from a domestic judge 
regarding an allegation of an obstruction of justice.  Domestic judges 
are in the best position to formulate a judgment about whether a 
prosecutor or judge exceeded his or her discretionary authority.  
Since these judges are familiar with domestic norms and practices, 
they are unlikely to censure a prosecutor or fellow judge without 
compelling evidence that corruption or obstruction of justice has 
occurred.  The provision for obtaining judicial opinions is intended to 
respect domestic norms and places judgments about criminality in the 
hands of individuals who are constitutionally vested with the role of 
deciding criminality. 
 The proposed treaty specifies that UN inspectors would submit 
reports to be published online by Transparency International.  This 
provision is analogous to the unsealing of an indictment by a U.S. 
prosecutor.  The intent of this provision is to illuminate corruption 
and obstruction of justice in a way that would be maximally 
embarrassing and very difficult to ignore, while still preserving the 
legitimate discretionary authority of honest prosecutors and judges.  
The treaty seeks to maintain that authority while addressing gross 
abuses engineered by powerful domestic elites that currently exploit 
countries where the rule of law is weak and impunity abounds. 
 It is likely that UN reports would receive attention from the 
media, especially if they include judicial opinions that an obstruction 
of justice has occurred.  The adverse publicity would be difficult to 
ignore.  UN inspectors would recommend charges to the appropriate 
prosecuting authorities or disciplinary agencies, and those agencies 
would, under the proposed treaty, enforce sanctions in accordance 
with agency practices and domestic law.  These provisions are 
intended to ensure that any prosecutor or judge who attempts to 
obstruct justice would be forced from office in the same way that the 
CICIG forced the resignations of public prosecutors in Guatemala for 
corruption, including Attorney General Juan Luis Florido, Senior 
Prosecutor Álvaro Matus, and Administrative Crimes Prosecutor 
Patricia Lainfiesta.95  
 Nigeria offers case examples illustrating how this could be 
accomplished.  In February 2014, Nigeria's National Judicial Council 
(NJC) forced two high court judges to retire, reprimanded an appeals 
court justice and two high court justices, and issued warning letters to 
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two high court justices for various acts of corruption, gross 
misconduct, and low productivity.96  The process employed by the 
NJC suggests how accountability over corrupt justices may be 
enforced when justices attempt to manipulate outcomes.  In particular, 
these cases suggest the process that may be employed to suppress any 
temptation to thwart investigations by UN inspectors. 
The NJC is comprised of the following: 
 
(a) the Chief Justice of Nigeria . . . [;] (b) . . . 
[a] senior Justice of the Supreme Court . . . ; 
(c) the President of the Court of Appeal; (d) 
five retired Justices selected by the Chief 
Justice . . . ; (e) the Chief Judge of the 
Federal High Court; (f) five Chief Judges of 
States . . . ; (g) one Grand Kadi . . . from the 
Sharia Courts of Appeal . . . ; (h) [the] 
President of the Customary Court of 
Appeal . . . ; (i) five members of the 
Nigerian Bar Association . . . [; and]  
. . . . (j) two persons [who are not] legal 
practitioners.97   
 
The Council is constitutionally vested with the responsibility of 
exercising disciplinary control over Nigeria's judicial officers and 
recommending the removal of officers for misconduct or poor 
performance.98  An eight-member committee of judges evaluates the 
performance of judicial officers, while a five-member committee of 
                                                
 96 Nigeria's National Judicial Council Forces 2 Judges into Compulsory 
Retirement, Reprimands 3 Others, SAHARA REP. (Feb. 27, 2014), 
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judges formulates recommendations regarding disciplinary actions.99  
Any individual, including a UN inspector, may file a complaint 
against any judge, triggering a hearing and possible disciplinary 
sanctions.100 
 The Council ordered Federal High Court Justice Gladys Olotu to 
retire after delaying judgment for eighteen months in a case that 
consumed a total of seven years, in violation of constitutional 
provisions that require judgment within a period of ninety days.101  
The NJC found that Justice Olotu "forgot" to deliver a ruling.102  In a 
second case, she failed to deliver a judgment twice, and in a third 
case, was guilty of reopening a matter in the absence of legal 
authority to do so.103  Investigative reports by the EFCC revealed that 
she possessed assets exceeding NGN 2 billion (equivalent to 
$12,388,000 USD) that were almost certainly obtained through 
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corruption.104  Similarly, the NJC ordered Federal High Court Justice 
U.A. Inyang to retire after finding that he had engaged in numerous 
deliberate, irregular, prejudicial actions.105  The NJC issued letters of 
reprimand to Presiding Appeals Court Justice Dalhatu Adamu, High 
Court Justice A. A. Adeleye, and High Court Justice D. O. 
Amaechina for misconduct and poor performance. 106  The NJC 
previously issued a reprimand to Federal High Court Justice 
Okechukwu Okeke, forcing his retirement. 107   In 2013, they 
suspended Federal Justice Abubakar Talba for twelve months 
without pay because of an investigation into his role in a police 
pension case involving John Yusuf, an Assistant Director in the 
Police Pension Office.108  Justice Talba had engineered a reduction in 
the charges against Yusuf and a concomitant reduction in the 
associated recommended sentence of fourteen years to two years of 
jail time; Talba then gave Yusuf the option of paying a fine of NGN 
250,000 ($1,549 USD) for each charge instead of imprisonment.109  
The egregious nature of the complaints against these justices led 
several members of the Nigerian legal profession to call for criminal 
prosecutions.110 
 The preceding examples from Nigeria suggest that UN 
investigations and referrals to disciplinary bodies such as the NJC 
would have real consequences for corrupt justices.  Even in one of 
the most corrupt nations in the world, immoral justices are not 
immune to public opinion.  A UN investigation and referral to a 
disciplinary body could trigger suspension, an order to retire, or 
forced retirement as a consequence of pressure exerted by the stain of 
a letter of reprimand.111  The stain of a UN investigation and a charge 
of corruption—especially a charge that is sustained by a judicial 
opinion—would be difficult to ignore and would undermine the 
legitimacy of a corrupt prosecutor or judge, causing erosion of public 
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support.  Without public support, corrupt prosecutors and judges may 
be forced from office, even in the most corrupt nations in the world.  
When faced with a real threat of vigorous investigation by 
independent investigators who are perceived to be incorruptible, even 
corrupt police, prosecutors, and judges may decide that virtuous 
behavior is the wisest course of action. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 The evidence from Guatemala and Nigeria suggests that UN 
investigations and referrals to disciplinary bodies could trigger the 
removal of corrupt prosecutors, judges, and government officials.  
They are not immune to public condemnation, and can only survive 
if their crimes are hidden from public view.  UN inspectors would 
serve to pull back the veil and expose corruption for the world to see.  
UN inspectors who act independently of the ethnic, tribal, and class 
rivalries endemic to Nigeria and other nations may possess a level of 
legitimacy not possessed by domestic police and domestic 
anticorruption units. 
 The proposed treaty seeks to multiply the power of public 
opinion by including a provision specifying that periodic updates 
regarding the progress of each case would be posted by Transparency 
International on a publicly accessible website.  Thus, any individual 
with access to the Internet could check the progress of cases as they 
meander through the domestic court system.  While Internet access is 
limited, as of December 2014, over 297 million Africans now have 
access, including most journalists in major African cities.112  When 
printed, their stories are widely accessible to the public.  In addition, 
citizen journalists, using mobile phones with Internet access, are 
“emerging as a powerful phenomenon across Africa.” 113  
Furthermore, significant news, including news about corrupt elites, is 
disseminated orally.114  Through these channels, and despite limited 
Internet access, the online publication of UN investigative reports 
                                                
 112 Internet Usage Statistics for Africa, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm (last visited June 15, 2015). 
113 Bruce Mutsvairo et al., Reconnoitering the Role of (Citizen) 
Journalism Ethics in the Emerging Networked Public Sphere, 35 AFR. 
JOURNALISM STUD. 4, 4 (2014). 
 114 Mary Omogor Ifukor, Channels of Information Acquisition and 
Dissemination among Rural Dwellers, 5 INT’L J. LIBR. & INFO. SCI. 306, 307 
(2013). 
252 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 11.2 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 
would ensure that efforts to thwart justice would become widely 
known.  The referral of charges regarding corruption or obstruction 
of justice to disciplinary bodies such as the NJC would likely trigger 
letters of reprimand, inflame public opinion, and create intense 
pressure to resign.  This process may force the resignations of 
powerful individuals in the same way that the CICIG forced Attorney 
General Juan Luis Florido, Senior Prosecutor Álvaro Matus, and 
Administrative Crimes Prosecutor Patricia Lainfiesta,115 and the NJC 
forced Federal High Court Justice Okechukwu Okeke to resign.116 
 While it may seem unlikely that mere investigations can stop 
corruption, this is exactly what happened in Hong Kong.  The Hong 
Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) did not 
have the power to convict, sentence, or imprison suspects, yet it was 
very successful in halting corruption.117  Until the advent of the 
ICAC, Hong Kong’s police force was notoriously corrupt. 118  
However, the introduction of the ICAC ensured for the first time that 
no corrupt police officer could feel safe from exposure.119  There 
would be no tip-off of a raid, inspection, or investigation, and no 
chance to hide or destroy evidence.  The calculus of the benefits and 
costs of corruption changed dramatically.120 
 In the same way, independent UN investigators could ensure that 
corrupt police, prosecutors, judges, legislators, and staff of 
anticorruption units never feel safe from exposure.  By exposing 
every member of the law enforcement community, prosecutor, judge, 
legislator, and investigator in an anticorruption unit to the threat of 
                                                
 115 Hudson & Taylor, supra note 23, at 69–70. 
 116 Shosanya & Azu, supra note 96. 
 117 See Bertrand E.D. De Speville, The Experience of Hong Kong, China, 
in Combating Corruption, in CURBING CORRUPTION: TOWARD A MODEL FOR 
BUILDING NATIONAL INTEGRITY 51, 51–58 (Rick Stapenhurst & Sahr J. 
Kpundeh eds., 1999); MELANIE MANION, CORRUPTION BY DESIGN: BUILDING 
CLEAN GOVERNMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA AND HONG KONG 27, 27–83(2004); 
Tan Ah Leak, The Experience of Singapore in Combating Corruption, in 
CURBING CORRUPTION: TOWARD A MODEL FOR BUILDING NATIONAL 
INTEGRITY 59, 59 (Rick Stapenhurst & Sahr J. Kpundeh eds., 1999); Beatrice 
Weder & Aymo Brunetti, Another Tale of Two Cities: A Note on Institutions 
in Hong Kong and Singapore, 156 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 
313, 314 (2000). 
 118 See Brief History, ICAC, http://www.icac.org.hk/en/about_icac/bh/ 
(last visited June 15, 2015); De Speville, supra note 117, at 51. 
 119 See De Speville, supra note 117, at 53.  
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investigation, independent investigators deter corruption in the very 
institutions that normally fight it.  Police are compelled to collect 
evidence, prosecutors are compelled to present evidence, judges are 
compelled to cite evidence, and legislators are compelled to 
investigate evidence of corruption, or risk investigation and 
prosecution themselves for favoritism and corruption.  When faced 
with the prospect of incarceration or removal, it becomes much easier 
for potentially corrupt police, prosecutors, judges, and legislators to 
decline bribes and to behave ethically.  At the same time, it becomes 
easier for honest police, prosecutors, judges, and legislators to 
advance themselves through competent work.  By deterring 
corruption and crime among crime fighters, independent 
investigators multiply the effectiveness of their own efforts to fight 
crime and restore the powers of the police, judiciary, and 
anticorruption units. 
 The experience of the ICAC suggests that the presence of 
independent investigators has a powerful effect on corrupt officials 
across all branches of government.121  When officials know that their 
telephones may be tapped, that any meeting might be recorded, and 
that any colleague may provide evidence to prosecutors, the potential 
for corruption is drastically reduced.  However, this is only the case 
when there is a truly independent body composed of inspectors that 
are perceived to be incorruptible.  This is what is needed, but has yet 
to be established by the international community. 
 The proposal to create a body of UN inspectors may be 
distinguished from the many failed attempts to create anticorruption 
units modeled after the ICAC.  The difference is that UN inspectors 
would be protected from the ability of domestic ruling elites to 
manipulate the jobs and careers of domestic investigators.  UN 
inspectors could not be removed in the same way that Mallam Nuhu 
Ribadu, the director of Nigeria's EFCC, was removed. 122   UN 
inspectors would have the authority to investigate any instances 
where corrupt police, prosecutors, or judges attempted to obstruct 
justice.  This would include the authority to obtain and execute arrest 
warrants for corrupt police and the ability to aggressively investigate 
corrupt prosecutors and judges.  This capacity would distinguish UN 
inspectors from the limited capacity of domestic anticorruption units 
that can be easily manipulated and thwarted by powerful ruling elites.  
                                                
 121 See id. at 56. 
 122 See Nigeria: Firing of Anti-Corruption Chief Would Boost Abusive 
Politicians, supra note 16. 
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 The proposal for an international treaty, modeled on the treaty 
authorizing the CICIG, was presented at the Symposium on 
Institutional Capacity, Corruption, and Development sponsored by 
the Rule of Law Collaborative on April 11, 2014, at the University of 
South Carolina School of Law.  The spirited discussion at the 
symposium suggested the need to write this article.  While space 
does not permit the author to address all of the issues posed by the 
treaty, numerous issues have previously been addressed in articles 
published in International Affairs,123 the International Public Policy 
Review, 124  the International Criminal Justice Review, 125  and the 
Journal of African Policy Studies.126  The interested reader is urged 
to read those articles, begin a serious examination of the proposed 
treaty, and consider the possibility that UN inspectors could have a 
profound effect on the culture of impunity that prevails wherever 
corrupt individuals feel the risk of punishment is low. 
                                                
 123 Yeh, Ending Corruption in Africa through United Nations 
Inspections, supra note 45. 
 124 Yeh, Why UN Inspections? The Accountability Gap in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, supra note 41. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 A draft protocol to the UNCAC, originally drafted to establish an 
African Commission Against Corruption (ACAC) and intended to 
deter corruption in African countries, could be broadly adapted for a 
protocol that would apply to signatories worldwide.  Upon entry into 
force, the treaty would empower the UN to create an ICAC to 
investigate allegations of corruption.  The preamble justifies the 
protocol by citing Articles 3, 10, 13, 43, 46, 48, and 62 of the 
UNCAC.  Article 62 of the UNCAC provides the legal basis for 
employing the resources of the UN, and Articles 3, 10, 13, 43, 46, 48, 
and 62 provide the legal basis to augment the capabilities of the 
police, law enforcement, and anticorruption agencies in developing 
countries to combat corruption.  Furthermore, the UNCAC provides 
the legal authority for law enforcement personnel of member states to 
act on behalf of the law enforcement personnel of a requesting state.  
Specifically, Article 46 of the UNCAC specifies that parties "shall 
afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in 
investigations, prosecutions[,] and judicial proceedings" in relation to 
corruption-related offenses.127  Finally, Article 62 of the UNCAC 
created a mechanism that could be used to fund the proposed ICAC 
through contributions by the World Bank, IMF, parties to the 
UNCAC, and the G8 countries, which have already agreed to commit 
substantial financial resources to fight corruption and ensure 
accountability and government effectiveness. 
 Thus, legal authority and a funding mechanism have already 
been established that would permit: (a) the establishment of a UN-
funded ICAC; (b) the use of ICAC inspectors to augment the 
capabilities of the police, law enforcement, and anticorruption 
agencies in developing countries; and (c) the employment of 
inspectors and law enforcement personnel of member states, through 
the ICAC, to act on behalf of the law enforcement personnel of a 
requesting state to conduct investigations, involving all of the powers 
enumerated in Article 46, listed above.  What is needed is not legal 
authority, but rather a UN protocol that spells out the details of how 
this would work in practice.  Thus, the draft proposal is framed as a 
protocol that supplements the UNCAC. 
 The draft protocol specifies procedures.  Any individual may 
submit an allegation of corruption.  After receiving a request for an 
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investigation, the ICAC, under the auspices of the UN Commission 
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, would prioritize and 
review the merits of each request.  The Commission would designate 
a UN inspector who would lead and supervise every aspect of the 
investigation, ensuring that the investigation is conducted in a 
manner that respects and abides by the laws and law enforcement 
procedures of the state where the investigation is conducted.  
Inspectors, their staff, and their surrogates would be immune from 
arrest or detention, and their papers, documents, and personal 
baggage would enjoy the inviolability accorded to diplomatic envoys 
in conformity with Article VI of the United Nations Convention on 
Privileges and Immunities.  However, an operations review 
committee would monitor their conduct and the propriety of all 
investigations, with members nominated by parties to the protocol.  
The operations review committee would refer cases of criminal 
misconduct by inspectors or their surrogates for prosecution under 
the laws and judicial system of the state where the inspectors or 
surrogates maintain citizenship.  
 UN inspectors would exercise their powers through production 
of a written authorization showing their identity and position, 
together with documentation indicating the subject matter and 
purpose of the on-the-spot check, inspection, or investigation.  
Individuals served with these documents would be required to 
comply under the same terms as would be required by the police, law 
enforcement, and anticorruption units of the state where the 
investigation is conducted.  Failure to comply would have the same 
consequences as failure to comply with investigations by the police, 
law enforcement, and anticorruption units of the state where the 
investigation is conducted.  
 Where witnesses or suspects resist an on-the-spot check, 
inspection, interview, or investigation, the police, law enforcement, 
and anticorruption units of the state where the investigation is 
conducted, acting in accordance with national rules, would give UN 
inspectors assistance as needed to allow them to discharge their duty 
in carrying out an on-the-spot check, inspection, interview, or 
investigation.  It would be for the police, law enforcement, and 
anticorruption units of the state where the investigation is conducted 
to take any necessary measures, in conformity with national law, to 
enforce cooperation.  In cases where an inspector believes that 
adequate and timely assistance has not been provided by the requisite 
police, law enforcement, judicial, and anti-corruption units, the 
inspector may file a request for censure by the Commission on Crime 
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Prevention and Criminal Justice.  The Commission would review the 
request and may subpoena evidence or interview witnesses.  The 
Commission would make a determination, by a majority vote, to 
approve or disapprove the motion for censure no later than twenty-
one days after receiving a request for censure. 
 Under the draft protocol, The World Bank and the IMF would 
develop and implement a system of reducing aid and credits in 
response to the magnitude and frequency of noncooperation with UN 
inspectors and their surrogates.  Parties to the protocol agree to abide 
by the judgment of the Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice with regard to the magnitude and frequency of any 
noncooperation, and with regard to the Commission’s 
recommendations for implementing reforms of the police, law 
enforcement, judicial, and anticorruption units of the state where the 
investigation is conducted. 
 Under the draft protocol, inspectors would hand over disposition 
of each case to the appropriate prosecuting authority upon 
completion of the investigation.  Each inspector would submit reports 
to the Commission every thirty days following assignment to an 
investigation until the investigation is completed and the case is 
handed over to the appropriate prosecuting authority.  When the case 
is handed over to the prosecuting authority, copies of the final report 
would be submitted to Transparency International, in addition to the 
relevant prosecuting authorities, to ensure that the reports are not 
ignored through the machinations of corrupt officials.  Transparency 
International would publish updates regarding the disposition of the 
case every thirty days, until the appropriate prosecuting authority or 
court dismisses the case, or the appropriate court reaches a final 
verdict. 
 The reports and all supporting documents would constitute 
admissible evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings of the 
member state in which their use proves necessary, in the same way 
and under the same conditions as administrative reports drawn up by 
national administrative inspectors.  They would be subject to the 
same evaluation rules as those applicable to administrative reports 
drawn up by national administrative inspectors and would be of 
identical value to such reports. 
 Under the draft protocol, parties to the treaty would establish a 
system of courts and prosecutors dedicated to the adjudication and 
swift resolution of charges of corruption.  The Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice would ensure that dedicated courts 
and prosecutors have regular and adequate funding to perform their 
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responsibilities, would conduct periodic reviews to evaluate the 
performance of dedicated courts and prosecutors, and would redirect 
funding based upon these evaluations.  Dedicated courts and 
prosecutors would prioritize charges submitted by UN inspectors or 
their surrogates, would ensure the swift resolution of resulting cases, 
and would not tolerate delays that pervert the course of justice. 
 Under the draft protocol, parties to the treaty would establish 
national judicial councils vested with the responsibilities of selecting 
justices and prosecutors of the utmost integrity to serve and ensure 
adequate staffing of dedicated courts, develop and implement 
streamlined adjudication procedures, ensure the swift resolution of 
corruption charges, evaluate the performance of justices and 
prosecutors, and censure and remove justices and prosecutors whose 
performance is substandard.  National judicial councils would be 
appointed by panels of justices, and prosecutors and would be 
composed of justices and prosecutors of the utmost integrity who are 
duly qualified to perform the responsibilities enumerated within the 
treaty.  National judicial councils would submit nominations of 
justices, prosecutors, and individuals nominated to serve on national 
judicial councils to the Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice.  The Commission would retain the power, upon a 
majority vote, to veto the nomination of any individual to serve on a 
national judicial council, veto the nomination of any justice or 
prosecutor to serve a dedicated court, and request the censure or 
removal of any justice or prosecutor serving a dedicated court whose 
performance is alleged to be substandard.  The Commission would be 
able to consider information provided by any individual as well as 
any governmental or nongovernmental body or organization in 
formulating its decisions.  
 To ensure the safety of witnesses, victims, and UN inspectors 
under the violent conditions that exist in many developing countries, 
the protocol specifies that UN inspectors would determine the 
measures necessary to protect their own safety and the safety of 
ICAC staff, witnesses, victims, and all individuals who assist with 
ICAC investigations.  The state where the investigation is conducted 
would implement measures requested by UN inspectors and their 
surrogates, including the use of armored vehicles, secure buildings, 
special plain-clothes guards, and measures to protect their identity.  
In addition, it may be necessary to implement witness protection 
measures including laws that permit closed trial sessions, the use of 
pseudonyms, voice distortion technology to shield the identity of 
witnesses while in court, and the use of confidential witness 
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interviews.  These measures have been employed to protect witnesses 
and victims testifying before the ICC and other international 
tribunals.128  It may be necessary to negotiate agreements with G8 
countries for the relocation of protected witnesses.  The necessary 
provisions may be written into the protocol or may be established 
through separate agreements.  While these provisions could not 
eliminate the threat of violence, the threat could be managed, as 
indicated by the success of Guatemala's CICIG, operating under 
similarly violent conditions. 
Despite the possibility of intimidation, there is ample precedent from 
Guatemala that witnesses and victims are willing to provide 
testimony and inspectors are willing to lead investigations, even 
under the violent conditions that prevail in Guatemala. 
 Under the proposed treaty, attempts to arrest, interfere with, or 
harm witnesses, victims, or inspectors, contrary to the wishes of UN 
inspectors, would constitute obstruction of justice.  Any attempt to 
delay or thwart the effort of a UN inspector to obtain a warrant for 
arrest, or the trial of an individual accused of corruption or 
obstruction of justice, and any prosecution or trial of an individual 
accused of corruption or obstruction of justice that is substantially 
irregular, violates accepted judicial norms and practices, and perverts 
the course of justice would constitute obstruction of justice.  These 
actions would trigger new ICAC investigations.  UN inspectors 
would submit reports to be published online by Transparency 
International.  They would recommend charges to the appropriate 
prosecuting authorities or disciplinary agencies and those agencies 
would, under the proposed treaty, enforce sanctions in accordance 
with agency practices and domestic law.  The protocol also specifies 
that a UN inspector may file a request for censure by the UN 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice if the 
inspector believes that obstruction of justice has occurred, or 
adequate and timely cooperation, assistance or protection have not 
been provided by the requisite police, law enforcement, judicial, anti-
corruption or government units.  The protocol specifies that the 
World Bank and IMF would develop and implement a system of 
reducing aid and credits in response to the magnitude and frequency 
of acts of noncooperation with UN inspectors and their surrogates.  
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